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Justices of the Supreme Court of Illinois, shortly after they heard argument in the Kirkland Courtroom of two cases from their regu
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of The

to

worry you for

lawyers and as
evening
or Democrats,
Republicans
(but
city dwell
ers or suburbanites) what are we to think of the role the
courts are playing or are trying to play in the reappor
tionment of the state legislatures? Should we applaud or
should we deplore? May we accept it as a new and proper
phase in the fulfillment of the historic role of courts in
a

The

PHIL C. NEAL

Law and Dean

is this: As

not as

system, or must we receive such benefits as it may
produce with misgivings if not with alarm? As to whether
it is useful or important for us to consider this question
our

I say

nothing.
question.

I suggest

only

that it is

an

interesting
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I hesitate

The

the issue

to state

precisely

more

done because it is. the kind of

than I have

which

problem
hardly
be reduced to a narrow proposition and in the end calls
more for intuition than for
analysis. It is possible, how
the
frame
area
of
to
ever,
uncertainty by recalling some
social
wise and eloquent mas
which
competing
insights
ters. in our field have
us. We
given
might start, for ex
with
admonition
in Baker v.
Frankfurter's
Justice
ample,
Carr itself, in his dissenting opinion: "In a democratic
society like ours, relief must come through an aroused
popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's
representatives." And alongside this we might put Judge
Learned Hand's similar declaration of
different but

surely

not

irrelevant

I think I do know-that

"

society

a

can

belief, uttered

context:

...

in

a

This much

riven that the

spirit
society

so

anisms for

edge of the same field of vision
possible force of Professor Freund's
to
Judge Hand's proposition: "The
gentle rejoinder
is
not
whether
courts can do everything but
question
whether they can do something." And although we may
doubt that Mr. Justice Holmes would have favored judi
cial intervention in legislative apportionment, we must
bear in mind the possible relevance of his observation that
on

the other

admit the

"the felt necessities of the time" have had much

to

do

the law has taken, and that "The sub
stance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corre
sponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood
with the

to

course

be convenient."

resting

Finally,

the remark made

who has himself had

I find

to me

more

than

by
a

at
a

least somewhat

ar

distinguished lawyer

small role in the

current

reapportionment controversy. Commenting on a piece of
mine which criticized the Supreme Court's position in
Baker u, Carr, he said: "Much of the academic world
seems to me to have far too little appreciation of the
depth and force of the currents on which the Court is
I am inclined to believe that many of the prob
riding
lems we now regard as conventional were once even more
baffling than these."
....

depth and force of the currents, perhaps, that
particular question of judicial responsibility
whatever special importance and interest it may have.
How should a court respond to strong currents?
It will also help mark out the contours and dimensions
of our question, I think, to see just what the problem of
reapportionment is, leaving aside the question of the ap
propriate means to achieve it. The inability to compel
representatives of thinly populated districts to surrender
their powers over state legislatures amounts to nothing
It is the

give

this

less than the breakdown of the

government. What it

means

existing

foundations of

is that the built-in mech-

nor

constitutional convention is

the established processes. In
be reconstituted.
The

"revolution" is

term

violence

to

ment

for

old. In
of

too

strongly

must

associated with

appropriate here, I suppose, but it has other
that are relevant. We really have no word
substitution of

a

old, by procedures

an

dealing

frame of govern
provided for in the

new

not

with the southern

Philadelphia

date, decided

to

in

after the Civil

states

called it reconstruction. What

we

men

short, the government

be

implications
for the peaceful

tion

must

amendment

on
possible
key parts of the
the
constitution
has failed. The
machinery-then
existing
transfer of political power must be accomplished outside

will

Bu then

resort to

because of the rural hold

War

perish."

the distribution of

political power
judicial help is really necessary-'
legislative act nor popular initiative nor consti

if neither
tutional
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adjusting

have failed. If

of moderation is gone, no court can save; that a
where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a
society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon
courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end

we

Law School

University of Chicago

was

it when the

1789, departing from their

substitute

a

new

man

constitution for the

Articles of Confederation and when. that

new

constitu

the ratification process prescribed
in the document itself? Is it not that kind of transition
which the courts. are being asked to bridge in the current
went

into effect

by

reapportionment litigation?
I do not overlook the point that,
is the Federal Constitution which

as

the

provides

case

the

is. put, it

continuity,

support and command. I mean only to stress the funda
mental nature of the function which the courts are being
called upon to perform. Should they respond?

Certainly

they
there

should
are

there
not.

are

strong

reasons on.

Mention of

two

the side of

must

others. The first is that there is

saying
suffice, though

no

body

of law

which points the way toward how a state legislature
should be reconstructed, and little likelihood that any

satisfactory body of law can emerge from the present liti
gation. The often-asserted principle of "one man, one
vote" gives no recognition to the equally important prin
ciple of adequate representation for minority interests,
furnishes no guidance on such crucial problems as the
size of the legislative body and the drawing of district
boundaries, and is capable of producing quite arbitrary
restrictions on the framing of state political processes. We
would not think of espousing it, for example, as the con
trolling rule for determining representation in the United
Nations.

principles which a court might declare have
suggested or seem likely to be. It is true that the
Supreme Court might find the problem easier for itself
than I have indicated. It might, for example, limit itself
to deciding that a state's representation scheme was "un
fair,". and avoid the difficult question of what would be
a fair
plan by remanding to the lower court with that
convenient directive, "for further proceedings not incon
sistent with this opinion.'" But the problems will not seem
that simple to the lower courts.
And this brings me to a second reason against judicial
No other

been
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attempts to deal with reapportionment. As
matter, what can a court do?

practical

a

ited

a

plan of representation. Its choices seem lim
admonishing the existing legislature or arranging

new

to

for the election of

a new one.

Unless the threat of the

second is

genuine, the first seems likely to be futile or to
produce only the mildest kind of self-correction. The ul
timate power which the courts are necessarily invoking
(and have in some instances already exercised) is the
power to create a new legislature, not merely the power
to

invalidate

a

law. So drastic

premacy would

perhaps

an

assertion of

less offensive

seem

judicial

su

democratic

to

reapportionment could
at least be submitted to ratification by the people, as would
a new
plan of representation framed by, let us say, a
if the

principles

judicial plan

constitutional convention. But
cree

to

our

to

condition

of the

independence
judicial function. Is

of

more

importance

and the

courts

there

de

be offensive
not a

lesson,

suggest that there
in the concept of separation of

in this dilemma? Does it

perhaps,

judicial

a

course,

notions of the

integrity
may be

of

popular approval would, of

on

not

powers than it is fashionable these days to believe?
Th{s issue of principle aside, courts concerned with the

vitality
heed

of the

judicial

the

function

must

give

least

at

some

possibility
they command may in
the end have to be enforced. I have not so far seen signs
to

that what

of serious resistance
cases, and I think
must we not

we

should

that somewhere,
may result in a contest for
chamber between a group of rep

recognize

sometime,

one

control of

a

of these

legislative

orders in apportionment
hope there will be none. But

judicial

to

as

possibility

a

cases

resentatives elected under federal

court

elected under the laws of the state?

be,

I think it is

not

irrelevant

to

order and

Unlikely

as

a
group
that may

consider whether in such

would expect to see the proceedings dictated
federal marshals armed with contempt citations, or

an event we

by

entrance to

the statehouse controlled

by

federal soldiers

armed with

bayonets. Judicial power is at its strongest
where it brings the force of the entire community behind
a
judgment of individual right or individual wrong based
on recognizable legal principles which in turn have the
sanction of community ethics. It is at its weakest, surely,
when it seeks to resolve the conflicting interests of large
groups in the community by enforcing mass compliance
with a judgment not based on established legal rules or
a
great moral principle. It is hard not to believe that if
judicial � -ver in apportionment cases were ever put to
the ultimate test it would end in judicial defeat.
So much for the negative side of the question. There is
_

of

course

another side,

the

as

I tried

to

indicate

doubt the consideration

to

most

at

the

outset.

be made in favor of

Perhaps
appealing point
judicial intervention in reapportionment,
most

was

difficult

It cannot, I assume, compel a legislature to enact, a
constitutional convention to propose, or the people to ini
tiate

Court,

and I have

influential with the

no

Supreme

or

lous risks

(the
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the argument of necessity. No matter how
novel the task, and despite some rather nebu

purity

implied),

argument

other

the

costs to

or

courts

of the

function

judicial

should

because all

act

closed. Judicial action was necessary
unlock the situation and release the pent-up democratic
energies which would then take over the process of re
avenues

were

to

form. A second

point which should

pose, is that it is difficult
can be no doubt that the

be

now

made,

I sup

There

argue with success.
Court's decision in

to

Supreme

Baker v. Carr has touched off a wave of activity and
brought about, or is in the process of bringing about,
legislative revision on a broad front. I do not think we
know how substantial this will

there is

moment

certainly

turn out to

reason to

Carr will indeed prove to have shifted
basis of power in our state legislatures.
It is about

be, but for the

believe that

Baker

materially

v.

the

point that analysis must give way and
How shall we appraise these argu
ments in favor of judicial reapportionment and how shall
we
weigh them against the vague and impalpable costs?
at

this

let intuition take

Whatever

one

over.

says

must rest

the

largely

speculation.

on

of

As

without

impossibility
reapportionment
judicial
own
speculation is that the obstacles to reform
were
exaggerated. I am sceptical that a determined and
organized political majority can indefinitely be denied its
proper voice in the state legislature. In Illinois, of course,
the reapportionment of 1954 came about shortly after the
courts had rejected efforts to obtain
judicial help. My
examination of the record in Baker v. Carr does not con
vince me that the failure to reapportion in Tennessee
represented more than the rather easy rejection of desul
tory efforts to obtain new legislation.
I suspect that in general the rural domination of state
legislatures has continued not in the face of the kind of
"aroused popular conscience" of which Justice Frank
furter spoke, but in the face of the same sort of apathy
that permits corrupt machines to dominate city politics
and inefficiency to dominate the administration of govern
ment. Indeed, it is possible to read the success of Baker v.
Carr as confirmation of this point of view. To the extent
that reapportionment has already occurred, it is hard to
to

help,

my

account

for in

terms

of the coercive power of the courts,
what that coercive power

although uncertainty about
might turn out to be has no
process. Is it

not

contribution of

doubt had

some

likely, however, that the

Baker

v.

It has focused attention

part in the

most

important

Carr has been its
on

the

polemic force?
problem, brought into the

to the need for reform,
widespread
create
a momentum for
helped
change which legis
lators find hard to deny-in short, it has itself helped gen
erate the "aroused popular conscience which sears the
conscience of the people's representatives."
In the end, perhaps, one's views of Baker V'. Carr must
turn on whether one believes that arousing the popular

open

and

a

consensus as

The
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LaW' School

which has been

and q uoted

in

in

responsibility of courts, independent
deciding cases. I may conclude by
with
variations, same themes suggested earlier:
echoing,
If the currents of reform are deep enough and strong
enough, a court need nat ride them but need only divert

by
Judge
"with special farce" in an opinion which is a "notable
judicial essay an the problem of court congestion and the

them into their proper channel; but if

concentration of the trial bar."

conscience is a proper
of their function of

ride

them,

perhaps

or

that it will have vision
shoals ahead. We

heady

to

a court

chooses

to

hope
generate them,
that there may be rocks and
we

must

to see

hope that by enjoying the
riding these currents the court is nat
people to surrender their democratic
officials appointed far life.
must

also

satisfactions of

encouraging the

responsibilities

to

state

praised

length

Delay

Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz, who
Schwartz puts his paint "eloquently" and

that

Schwartz's

Judge

at

Messrs.

the Courts,

indicate

opinions

his belief

clearly

that the judge should play an active and enlightened role
in the growth and development of the law, within the
interstitial area in which it is proper far a judge to "make
law." He

does

recognizes that the judge

nat

have full free

dam of action, when he states:" "This is nat a matter in
valving method or practice or those interstices of the law
where

have latitude. A

courts

is

court

nat

the forum

to

Book Review

consider the effect of the

Opinions of Judge Ulysses S.
Workman
Schwartz. 222 pp. Privately Printed. Preface by Justice
Walter V. Schaefer; Foreword by Judge Edwin A.

upan the marital status and mold its opinion ta farm a
public policy sa determined. Public opinion cannot be
consulted by a court nor can social investigators be en
gaged ta inquire into such matters. We must adhere to

in the Law: The

the

Robson.
Reviewed by STANLEY A. KAPLAN
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School
The reuicu/ which

in The

Decalogue Journal,
Volume 13, Number 1, September-October, 1962, and is reprinted
here with the gracious permission of that publication and of the
follows appeared

author.

As a gesture of honor to Judge Ulysses S. Schwartz of
the Illinois Appellate Court upan the occasion of his 75th

birthday,

his

opinions

have been edited and

compiled by
Chicago Bar,
This compilation

Louis A. Kahn and Edward R. Lev of the

and

the

published by
judge's brothers.
is, however, no inconsequential presentation piece issued
by a "vanity press"; it is a volume which merits a place of
respect an the shelves of any library.

proposed

type of

new

litigation

traditional method of construction." He has

mare

a

decent respect far precedent, a good craftsman's under
standing of it, and a willingness to deal openly with it;

but he is

nat

In Eich

hobbled

or

Perk Dog

paralyzed by
Food

CO.,4

it.

of first

impres
Illinois,
upheld
right
privacy in an eru
dite opinion examining the right of privacy in its legal,
social, and historical aspects. The Eick opinion states,
page 37, "But even if we grant defendants' paint of view
that the right of privacy has no foundation in ancient
common law, it does nat follow that we should
deny
v.

he

sian in

the

mean

....

of

recavery. To

plaintiff's right to
lack of precedent is
ticular date

a case

to

With

freeze the

changing

relief because of

deny

common

times

law

as

rigidity

of

a

can

par

often

injustice."

With

similar

and

Judge Schwartz's opinions is their facility of expression
and felicity of allusion. Their literary grace makes them
genuinely pleasing to read. They tend to be written in
what Professor Llewellyn! has termed the "Grand Style"
of opinion writing, as contrasted with the "Formal Style";
in Llewellyn's terminology, this suggests no grandiose
ness but means that the
opinion places its legal problem

between tortfeasors is

perspicacity, Judge
indemnity
inapplicable where the liability of

tortfeasor is

and active and the ather

and the

torts were

The

mast

immediate and obvious characteristic of

rules in proper perspective in the factual
situation and discusses the social and legal considerations

pertinent

relevant

to

the decision and

development of a use
deeper significance than lit
characterize and pervade Judge
to

the

ful rule. Other attributes-of
erary

lustre-that

are his concern with the effect of the
the
opinion upan
society, his focus upan the social utility
of the law, and his constant concern with improving the
manner of
rendering justice. This concern is illustrated by
his many trenchant suggestians far revising rules or
statutes which he deems outmoded or unwise; it is par

Schwartz's

ticularly

opinions

well

epitomized by

his

opinion

in

Gray

v.

Gray,2

flexibility

Schwartz held that the doctrine which denies
one

primary

sec

and

passive." "The principle of no contributions
and no indemnity between all joint tortfeasors is mare a
rule of ethics than a principle of law. The law simply
closed its door to the inter se disputes of those wham it

ondary

considered

be bad

This

originated at a time when
as slander, libel, and
assault and battery. Today, torts are mainly the incidents
of industry and transportation, To continue to apply the
rule

to

to

men.

in the main such wrongs

such

cases as

jealous mistress, but

that before
a

us

would make the law

squeamish damsel, refusing

to

no

have

anything to do with a couple of respectable suitors because
grandfather once told her they were joint tortfeasors."
That his participation in the development of the law is
conscious and sophisticated is indicated by such statements

her

"This is haw the doctrine emerges from the cases
common method
far the development of our law and represents its unique
as:

which have considered it. That this is the

